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In early December, President Trump hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. The administration announced that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, striking sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

This contrast encapsulates the core tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from advocating for democracy and human rights in favor of a declared focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—though how this fits with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a mantra often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” stated a top U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson reinforced this, commenting the President “views Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Inconsistencies

This shift is major, but observers caution it is premature to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from over twenty African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Implementing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

International Apathy and Tensions

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous engagement with African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has erupted with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Selective Intervention

An analogous tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation split between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the harsh rhetoric may have spurred the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to end the fighting in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Other Powers

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on commercial interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about is not aimed at spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a transactional posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.